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Abstract: In this study, we proposed a new game theoretic method to design a mating program. The index and game theoretic methods
were applied with calculated breeding values using pedigree on two different data sets whose economic traits consist of negative (milk
yield and fat percentage) and positive (birth and weaning weight) genetic correlated data. For the negative genetic correlated data set,
even if total expected benefits were equal for two methods, mating programs were changed, and the coefficient of variation obtained
using the game theoretic method was smaller than that of the index method. This result showed that the expected breeding value will
be more homogeneous in the next generation if the game theoretical approach is used. For the positive genetic correlated data set, the
total expected benefit obtained from the index selection was a bit higher than the expected benefit obtained from the game theory. In
terms of the coefficient of variation, selection of the index method provides 25% more homogeneous next generation flock structure
than the game theoretic approach. When the results examined, it is clear that more studies should be done using game theoretical
modeling, which is a new approach for animal mating design.
Key words: Game theory, animal mating design, breeding value, selection

1. Introduction
Game theory is a mathematical language for describing
strategic interactions in which each player's choice affects
the payoff of other players [1]. With a more simple
sentence, game theory is a method examining to give the
best response to expected strategies of their competitors
for two or more players [2]. Individuals or groups that
make decisions in the game are called players that can be
considered as genes, people, companies, nation-states, etc.
The players are assumed to be rational and take their
knowledge and their expectations (beliefs) of the
opponents’ behavior into account [1].
In general, it is possible to classify games in two ways
as chance and strategy games. Chance games are one
player games, which played against nature. Strategy
games can be played with two or more players. Strategy
games can be classified according to result of the game;
zero-sum games in which one's winnings are equal to the
loss of the other or nonzero sum games that reveal
balance situations that may be profitable on both sides.
The games can be shown as flat-shaped games defined as
normal or a tree in which the player's benefits are shown
in a table where analogous considerations to the ones
concerning strict dominance can be carried out for the
elimination of weakly dominated strategies [3, 4].
* Correspondence: honder@omu.edu.tr
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Strategic game, normal game, and non-collaborative game
expressions can be defined as similar expressions.
The expected benefit is the number of progenies or the
number of copies of genes transferred to future
generations [5]. Businesses engaged in livestock want to
improve their livestock in order to maximize the benefits
(offspring, meat, milk, wool, honey, etc.) they are
expecting from the animals. Animal breeding aims to
increase the genotypic value of the population in terms of
the interested character in next generation [6]. The
strategies that are expected to maximize benefit within a
generation are built through both natural and breeding
selection. High-yielding individuals are determined as
breeding material by selection; hence, these animals have
a chance to give more offspring to increase the benefit of
next generation [7].
In the case of classical breeding, it is possible to
calculate the individual index economic value for the
females and males by using the selection index method,
which is generally used in the case of more than one trait,
and the mating programs can be formed by arranging
these economic values descending. In this study, we
propose a game theoretic approach for livestock
production. At first, female and male animals within the
same breed were described as players. According to the
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strategies they set out using the breeding values (BW)
calculated from the pedigree records and phenotypic data
using random regression test day model, the game was
designed as a non-zero-sum and non-cooperative game. A
pure Nash equilibrium (a Nash equilibrium is a set of
strategies that players act out, with the property that no
player benefits from changing their strategy, in other
words, a Nash equilibrium is a profile of actions where
each player’s action is optimal given the actions of others)
of the normal form game was found if possible. If not, a
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium was found. These
equilibria were used to match males and females to design
a mating program. The purpose of this study is to
investigate and apply a game theoretic method designing
an animal mating program under the hypothesis that the
game theory may be more useful for this aim than the first
study in the literature. Then, we discuss the differences
and similarities between the selection index and this new
method by comparing the results obtained from both
mating programs.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Material
Two different data sets with negative and positive genetic
correlations were used in the study. The first set of data is
from a Jersey cattle breed with 5 head bulls and 50 head
cows with BW’s estimated for lactation milk yield (kg) and
fat percentage (%), obtained from a commercial dairy
farm for negative genetic correlation (–0.37). The second
set of data is from Saanen goat breed with 5 head bucks
and 50 head goats with BW’s estimated for birth and sixth
month weight, obtained from a commercial dairy goat
farm for positive genetic correlation (0.47). In the
realization of the analysis, MATLAB V.7.12.0.635 software
was used with license number 161052. A used code was
taken from Chatterjee [8].
2.2. Methods
Subjecting animals to selection is the only way that animal
breeding can be accomplished. The animals are mated in
the framework of a prepared mating design to obtain the
next generation where the effect of the selection
procedure can be seen. This selection can be performed by
using the index method in cases where more than one trait
is relevant. The index value can be calculated using the
equation

I = WA xA + WB xB + ... + WK xK ,

to values and female animals determined to mate with
male animals [9].
Alternatively, we now propose the game theoretic
method to design an animal-mating matchup. In
particular, we use bimatrix games whose set of players is
denoted by N = {1, 2}, and their finite strategy sets are
denoted by K and L. Then, one can describe the values of
payoff functions by using a bimatrix as shown in Table 1
[10]. For numerical examples please check out
(http://euler.fd.cvut.cz/predmety/game_theory/games_
bim.pdf).
Here,

player 1, and

K indicated the phenotypes or BW). To design the mating,
program all animals were arranged descending according

L = {l1 , l2 ,..., ln } is the finite strategy set of

player 2. Assume that p1 and p2 are payoff functions of
player 1 and player 2, respectively. When the strategy
pairs (ki, lj) were chosen, aij=p1(ki, lj) is the profit of
player 1, and bij=p2(ki,lj) is the profit of player 2
(http://euler.fd.cvut.cz/predmety/game_theory/games_
bim.pdf).
2.2.1. Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Let player set is N = {1,..., n} when n>1 in a noncooperative game. i: any player, Si: strategy set of any
player i, S-i: strategy set of player other than player i,

S1 ,..., Sn : set of all strategies and P1 ,..., Pn : payoff
functions of players. A non-cooperative game can be
defined as;

G = ( N ,(Si )iN ,( pi )iN ) or G = S1 ,..., S n , p1 ,..., pn  .
For all

iN for Si  0 ; pi , S = 
S ;
− iN − i

pi = S1 x...xS n → R .
S
2.2.2. Best Response Function
s  S , where s is any strategy profile. si: strategy set of
any player i, s-i: strategy set of player other than player i,

s i : possible strategy of player i and i (s−i ) : best strategy
set of player i, hence the best response function can be
defined as;
Table 1. Bimatrix illustration for normal form game with two
players.
Player 2

where

(WA ,WB ,WK ) are economic weights for traits (A, B and

K = {k1 , k2 ,..., km} is the finite strategy set of

Player 1



l1

l2

ln

k1

(a11, b11)

(a12, b12)

(a1n, b1n)

k2

(a21, b21)

(a22, b22)

(a2n, b2n)

(am1, bm1)

(am2, bm2)

(amn, bmn)


km
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i ( s−i )  arg max pi ( si , s−i )

strategy must be used, and this game is played by
randomizing the strategies.

si Si

 si  S i : pi (si , s −i )  pi (si , s −i )  S i 

When

For a game with two players, best responses of both
players to other can be defined as;



i

is a set of probability distributions over

s1* = ( s2* ) : s1* is the strategy profile of player 1

 i  i

s = ( s ) : s is the strategy profile of player 2

chosen action

*
2

*
1

*
2



s i Si

Let

the Pure Strategy Nash equilibrium is because the strategy
of a player is the best response to the strategies of other
players. s = ( s , s ) only if

(s (s
*

*



 i

 −i

is mixed

is possible strategy of

is possible strategy of players other than i,

is mixed strategy profile of player i,

 −i

is mixed



is mixed



 p (s

s i Si

i

i

,  −i )

i

(s i )

 n

p
(
s
,
s
)

i
i
−i    j s j 
sS
 j =1


This payoff function can be interpreted that the
expected payoff should be von-Neumann Morgenstern
(VNM) for chosen strategies of players.

i ( −i )  arg max pi ( i ,  −i )

S i0 = S i for k=0

i

i



  i  i : pi ( i ,  −i )  pi ( i ,  −i ) i  i





For example, for a two-player game, the Nash



equilibrium of a  mixed strategy is due to the fact that a
player's mixed strategy is the best response to the mixed
strategies of other players.

Step 3 k+1

*



Si k +1 si  Si k \ si  Si k pi (si , s−i )  pi (si , s−i )s−i  S−ki
Step 4

Si

k

2.2.4. Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
In some games, there is no pure strategy Nash
equilibrium. To find the Nash equilibrium, a mixed
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i

 − i

=

of the deletion of strictly dominated strategies, a new
game is obtained, and this process ends in the fourth step:
Step 1

Si =

is any mixed strategy profile,

pi ( i ,  − i ) =

Si k (k=0,1,2...) for each player iN . In every step


k =1

(s i ) = 1 .

strategy profile and i ( −i ) is the best mixed strategy set
of player i; to explain mixed strategy space, the payoff on
mixed strategy can be defined as follows:

2.2.3. Iterated elimination of strictly dominated
strategies
Strictly dominated strategy is a strategy that a rational
player will not play [11, 12]. Since each player knows that
the other player will not play the strictly dominant
strategy, these strategies are deleted from the game. This
process is named as “Iterated Elimination of Strictly
Dominated Strategies” and defined with an algorithm that
has
an
iteratively
shrinking
strategy
set



i

strategy profile of players other than i,

pi (si* , s−*i ) ≥ pi (si , s−*i ), ∀i ∈ N , ∀si ∈ S





player i,

the pure strategy Nash equilibrium is as described in the
following equation;

Si1 = si  Si0 \ si  Si0 pi (si , s−i )  pi (si , s−i )s−i  S−0i

si .

strategy of players other than i,

)) .As a result,

Step 2

 i (s i ) is the probability that player i

, then

not null set of Si . So,

The equilibrium obtained by solving the n equations is
*
Nash equilibrium. The fact that the s strategy profile is

*
2

. Thus, if

i

Probability distribution is s i : Si → 0,1 over finite

pi ( s1 , , s n )
p
= 0 , i=1,…,n and 2i  0 .
s i
s i

*
1



Si

 

here it should be,

*

is mixed strategy space of any player i,

σ* = (σ1* , σ2* )
Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium can be defined as
(https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/dsgroi
/ec202/w06_dominant_strategies_and_iesds.pdf;
http://www.sam.sdu.dk/~psu/teaching/phd/draft.pdf);
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pi ( i* ,  −*i )  pi ( i ,  −*i ), i  N ,  i  i
Here, we suppose that the row players are males, and
the column players are females. The payoff matrix is
constructed by adding the breeding values of individual
male and female animals. If we want to optimize the milk
yield and fat percentage of ith male and jth female animals,
for instance, then aij (bij) is the addition of ith male and jth
female animals milk (fat) characteristic values.
Then, one finds the Nash equilibrium of the game to
match each male with a desired number of female animals.
When jth female is matched with a male the jth row of the
bimatrix is deleted. When ith male is matched with a
desired number of females, the ith column is deleted from
the bimatrix. This process is continued until all animals
are matched.
To compare the expected benefits (EB) and coefficient
of variation (CV) between methods Mann–Whitney U test
was used [13]. The variability of CV was calculated among
sires.
3. Results
The selection index method applied to more than one
character in classical breeding is calculated as a linear
combination of individual breeding values and
maximization is aimed at selection [14, 15]. The benefits
obtained in the negative genetic correlation scenarios
were shown in Table 2 for the selection index and in Table
3 for the game theory methods. The benefits obtained in
the positive genetic correlation scenarios were shown in
Table 4 for the selection index and in Table 5 for the game
theory methods.
When the mating design generated by the selection
index and game theory is examined in terms of the traits
with negative genetic correlations between them, it is
Table 2. The expected benefits of the mating program
generated by the selection index in terms of traits have
negative genetic correlations for Jersey cattle.
Bull
101
106
110
111
122
Cow
1
–104.2
137.4
–0.8
179.3
254.9
2
–106.2
135.3
–1.1
175.5
249.5
3
–121.6
120.8
–1.9
169.5
247.8
4
–128.8
119.2
–3.9
168.8
230.1
5
–132.5
116.7
–9.8
167.3
218.8
6
–133.1
113.5
–11.4
164.56
215.7
7
–137.4
111.4
–24.9
162.1
200.1
∑EBi
–863.8
854.3
–53.9
1187.2
1616.9
CV

10.8

∑EB

2740.6

CV

166.3

8.4

113.2

3.6

8.9

The numbers at the first row and column shows the animal ID.

Table 3. The expected benefits of the mating program
generated by the game theory in terms of traits have negative
genetic correlations for Jersey cattle.
Bull
101
106
110
111
122
Cow
1
–19.3
106.6
114.1
155.5
109.8
2
–23.1
106.2
108.7
153.4
107.8
3
–29.1
105.5
106.9
138.9
92.4
4
–29.9
103.4
89.2
137.3
85.2
5
–31.4
97.6
77.9
134.8
81.6
6
–34.1
95.9
74.8
131.7
80.9
7
–36.5
82.4
59.3
129.5
76.6
∑EBi
–203.4
697.7
630.9
981.1
634.3
CV

20.7

∑EB

2740.6

CV

75.1

8.8

22.8

7.3

14.7

The numbers at the first row and column shows the animal ID.
Table 4. The expected benefits of the mating program
generated by the selection index in terms of traits have positive
genetic correlations for Saanen goat.
Buck
101
102
110
115
119
Goat
1
–0.7
0.2
–0.5
1.6
2.7
2
–0.7
0.1
–0.5
1.5
2.6
3
–0.7
0.1
–0.5
1.5
2.5
4
–0.8
0.0
–0.6
1.5
2.5
5
–0.9
0.0
–0.6
1.5
2.3
6
–0.9
0.0
–0.7
1.5
2.2
7
–0.9
–0.2
–0.7
1.5
2.2
∑EBi
–5.7
0.3
–4.0
10.4
16.9
CV

12.0

∑EB

17.9

CV

247.2

287.6

14.2

2.3

8.1

The numbers at the first row and column shows the animal ID.
Table 5. The expected benefits of the mating program
generated by the game theory in terms of traits have positive
genetic correlations for Saanen goat.
Buck
101
102
110
115
119
Goat
1
–0.0
–1.1
–1.5
2.0
2.7
2
–0.7
0.3
–1.4
1.7
2.5
3
–0.3
0.3
–0.2
1.3
2.2
4
0.0
–0.5
–0.5
0.9
2.6
5
–0.7
–1.0
–1.0
1.0
2.0
6
–0.5
0.3
–1.1
0.8
2.3
7
–0.3
0.2
–0.9
1.5
1.7
∑EBi
–2.5
–1.6
–6.5
9.2
15.9
CV

81.1

∑EB

14.4

CV

310.0

271.1

49.3

32.5

15.3

The numbers at the first row and column shows the animal ID.

seen that the animals selected for breeding are the same
animals in both methods. In other words, the mating
method didn’t affect the selection of the animals for
breeding. But different mating couples of animals were
observed for methods. Results showed that the total
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Table 6. Comparison of selection index and game theoretic
approaches.
Negative genetic
Positive genetic
correlation
correlation
EB
CV
EB
CV
548.1 ±
28.9 ±
3.6 ±
64.8 ±
Selection index
447.24
21.08
4.35
55.71
548.1 ±
14.9 ±
2.9 ±
89.9 ±
Game theory
198.60
3.09
4.17
46.59
P for Mann
0.60
0.60
0.75
0.12
Whitney U

expected benefits were equal (2740.63) for both methods.
This may be caused from the fact that selected animals for
breeding were same for both methods. When variation
coefficient (CV) was examined, it can be seen that the
value obtained from the mating design realized by the
game theoretic approach was much lower than the value
obtained from the mating design according to the
selection index. This result can be regarded an indicator of
a more homogeneous expected benefit that can be
obtained at the new generation from the mating program
realized by the game theoretic approach than selection
index. Comparison of the selection index and game
theoretic approaches were given in Table 6.
4. Discussion
Although the index method is still popular for its various
advantages nowadays, it is difficult to calculate the values
used in the calculation of the index equation, which
contains high sampling error, the contribution of each
genotype has different effect on population genotypes and
the maximization of the individuals obstructed the
calculation of economic contribution to the population. It
also brings disadvantages that one of the most prominent
problems of the selection index method is that the traits
or yields that enter the index while individuals selected
can change out of control from positive to negative [9, 15]
This problem has been overcome since the expected
benefit of the population is optimized in the developed
game theoretic approach.
In the comparison by expected benefit and coefficient
of variation (CV) for negative genetic correlated data, for
the bull with ear number of 110, the expected benefit was
higher (–53.94<630) in the game theoretic approach than
the index method, and CV was lower (166.28>75.11) in
the game theoretic approach than the index method. In the
index method, the expected benefit of the bull 122 was
decreased nearly 61% and CV was increased nearly two
times when comparing with the game theory. This result
shows that the game theory method is more likely to
provide a number of advantages such as a more
homogenous mating design and, thus, the increase of the
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desired genotypes in the population in the sense of animal
breeding and the simplicity of maintenance and feeding
conditions and the ease of herd management in terms of
raising animals.
For positive genetic correlated data, selected animals
for breeding were not same for two methods. Only 82.86%
of animals were same for mating selection. It was found
that the expected benefit obtained by the index method
was a bit higher (17.913>14.438) than the game theoretic
approach. When the CV was examined, it was found that
the index method was 25% homogeneous than the game
theoretic approach. For both sets of data that contain both
negative and positive genetic correlations, the common
feature of the two methods is that the best optimizing bull
/ buck is over after the other bull / buck. This leads to the
conclusion that the data may be related to cardinal values
(numerical quantities).
According to the results obtained, it is understood that
the game theoretic approach produces homogenous next
generation expectancy especially when it is aimed to
perform selection and mating design in terms of features
having negative genetic correlation between them. The
homogeneity of the expected utility of the next generation
in animal breeding is gaining importance, which is why
the variance of the response given to the environmental
conditions that will arise will be reduced, and, therefore,
the environmental conditions can be controlled more
easily [16]. The homogeneity of the trait to be breed also
increases the success of the statistical methods used in
animal breeding [17]. The optimization of both sexes is
more important in animal breeding, especially for
fattening characters, even if used methods are based on
the selection of male individuals and their maximization
without any expected benefit loss.
While there is individual benefit in the selection index,
population utility is the forefront in the game theoretic
approach. Use of the game theory may be more beneficial
on the populations that desired breeding aims have been
nearly reached. It is desired to increase the homogeneity
in the obtained progeny population with using the game
theoretic approach. In this way, it will be possible to
manage the environmental conditions much more easily
in practice, and the operating costs can be reduced. In this
respect, it is important that the offspring population can
be obtained homogeneously [6]. Taking all the analysis
results into consideration, it is quite clear that there is a
need for further study on the game theory which was a
new approach to animal mating designs in order to
validate the efficiency of the game theoretic approach on
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experimental breeding studies to show the methods
superiority for optimization and maximization.
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